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The Fiscal Illusion is a old phenomenon with a new consideration. Historically speaking the first 
theorist  of  this  concept  is  the  Italian  economist  Amilcare  Puviani  (1854-1907).  As  is  widely 
recognized by many economists the contributions on Public Finance are developed basically in Italy 
during  the  XIX  Century.  However,  all  these  separated  concepts  were  been  structured  and 
systematized only during the XX Century. These concepts are became object of study by the Public 
Choice and in particular by James Buchanan, which is the architect of a coherent framework (or as 
defined euphemistically by himself a Research Program in  political economy1) which integrate 
all  the  development  of  macroeconomics  theory,  with  the  studies  on  the  public  finance,  with 
particular reference on the Italian school which produced original ideas2. 
Although  there  is  not  a  general  consent  on  the  definition  of  Fiscal  Illusion because  often  in 
economy  the  original  definition  was  substitute  by  the  main  effects,  (as  explicative  example 
considers the correct definition of inflation as point out by Mises) in his general formulation, the 
Fiscal Illusion suggests that when government revenues not completely transparent or are not fully 
perceived by taxpayers, then the cost of government is seen to be less expensive than it actually 
is. 
Since some or all taxpayers benefit from government expenditures from these unobserved or hidden 
revenues, the public's appetite for government expenditures increases, thus providing politicians 
incentive to expand the size of government3.
In  this  proposition  are  contained numerous  economics  unintuitive  mechanisms,  which  must  be 
examined, more in detail. Buchanan (1967) provides a formulation of Puviani's theory, in his essays 
and contribute to a reconsideration of the original concept which produce a substantial new 
literature on Fiscal Illusion, most of it mainly empirical and related to the public governance4. The 
essence of the empirical work on Fiscal Illusion consists of econometric studies based upon some 
kind of model of public spending5. 
From a epistemological point of view, Puviani’s work although formulated in the beginning of the 
XX century, adopts theoretical concepts not available by the theory during the time of formalization 
but  only  many  years  after,  such  as:  the  hypothesis  of  asymmetric  information,  the  concept  of 
rationality which became a fundamental assumption for the behavioral economics and the others 
new fields of economy. This presence of concepts not adequately acquired from the mainstream, has 
1 Cfr.: J. M. Buchanan – Politics without Romance – Policy • Vol. 19 No. 3 • Spring 2003. p. 1-6.
2 Cfr.: R. E. Wagner  – Public Choice and the Diffusion of Classic Italian Public Finance – Il Pensiero Economico 
Italiano 11, 2003. p. 271-282.
3    Cfr.: J. M. Buchanan – Public Finance in Democratic Process – Vol. 4, Chapter 10. Liberty Fund, 1966. p.100-111.
4 Cfr.: P. Reis Mourao – Towards a Puviani’s Fiscal Illusion Index – Revista de Economía Pública, 187- (4/2008), p. 
49-86.
5 Cfr.: W. E Oates  – On the Nature and Measurement of Fiscal Illusion: A Survey  – In G. Brennan et  al.,  eds., 
Taxation and  Fiscal  Federalism:  Essays  in  Honor of  Russell  Mathews (Sydney:  Australian  National  University 
Press, 1988). p. 65-81.
generated many difficulties which affect on the acceptance among economists, because the notions 
of rationality make claims about illusion that seem to border on being assertions of irrationality6. 
In his essay Puviani analyze different cases of Fiscal Illusion, the specific situation are described 
and enriched by Buchanan, with the opportune reflections. In general terms we can affirm that the 
illusions are created through taxes and through public spending programs or mix of both.  
First of all the total revenues needs for produce the public services, and any individualized share in 
this total may be obscured to the taxpayers, this situation produce an evident Fiscal Illusion.  
Although the cases described in Puviani 's analysis are interesting, many economists are convinced 
that his model appear not close to current institutional setting, in particular the general hypothesis of 
continuous research of Fiscal Illusion by the government is not always verified7.     
As stressed by Buchanan in clear sense “Puviani looked at the whole fiscal process through a 
“different window”  from that which has been used by English-language critics. The institutions 
were to be explained, in his vision, by the unconscious motivation of the ruling class to exploit the 
ruled. Upon closer examination, however, we see that Puviani did little more than make explicit 
some of the norms for fiscal organization that were also widely accepted by the utilitarians”8. 
Respect to the role of the economics we can say that Puviani assumes a neutral position regards the 
government, similar to the Public Choice. The essence of the Phenomenon is related  with  the 
concept of correct information and consequent behavior. If the chooser does not possess adequate 
information about alternatives and if he is uncertain, he conceptualizes the alternatives 
imperfectly. If he is affected by an illusion, he conceptualizes the alternatives falsely. It is evident 
from the assertion mentioned that in this scenario the role of expectations is important, it is needs 
remember that a illusions may be both optimistic and pessimistic.
The cases study of Fiscal Illusion are very large, a complete description is not possible in this paper, 
(in that case it is needs a specific essay); however  the different institutional setting joint with the 
level of fantasy of the politicians play a relevant role in every country. However it is possible 
explains some general principles which are the essential elements presents in a Fiscal Illusion:
• A constraining fiscal policy is in general obtained with a reduction of the public spending or 
with a raise of the taxation. In both cases the costs are immediate, while the benefits are 
often perceived in the future.    
• Another situation is generated between benefits concentrated, i.e. directed to specific group 
or social category, and costs diffused, shared between numerous taxpayers. In other words, 
the concentration of the benefits (public spending or fiscal advantage) in a restricted group 
produce a strong reaction, because a common interest is concentrated and organized. On the 
contrary the presence of costs diffused make difficult organize a real resistance, because the 
individual cost of resistance could cost more than the single tax requested. 
• Another situation is originated by the contrast between visible benefits, which are perceived 
by the direct interested and invisible costs which are not perceived by the taxpayers. The 
visibility produce consent for the politicians proponent, whereas the frequent invisibility of 
the costs neutralize the opposition. This scenario explains because the increase of the public 
spending conduct systematically to a deficit, the cost is future diffused and so  invisible, 
whereas the benefit is immediate concentrated and directly perceivable.      
• The progressive taxation is another source of Fiscal Illusion, because in presence of a 
increase of nominal salary, the marginal ratio  is directed in great part to the fiscal agency, 
with a effect on the real salary reduced respect to the nominal terms. 
6 Cfr.: R. E. Wagner  – Public Choice and the Diffusion of Classic Italian Public Finance – Il Pensiero Economico 
Italiano 11, 2003. p. 271-282.
7 Cfr.: B. Dollery,  A. Worthington -  The Empirical Analysis of Fiscal Illusion - Journal of Economic Surveys 10(3):
(1996). pp. 261-297.
8 Cfr.: J. M. Buchanan - Public Finance in Democratic Process – Vol. 4, Chapter 10. Liberty Fund, 1966. p.100-111.
The attention directed to the Fiscal Illusion is increased even with  the contribution of empirical 
investigation as expressed before. One part of the economics literature concentrates the attention on 
the mechanisms of measurement. Furthermore, the increase of public debt in many countries moved 
the  attention on others  factors  respect  to  the  traditional  element  considered  by the mainstream 
economics, which are not enough for a exhaustive explanations.   
An interesting investigation in this field, was conducted by Paulo Reis Mourao9. The author builds 
an  index  for  Fiscal  Illusion  for  attempt  to  provide  a  clear  benchmark,  in  his  article  after  the 
identification of the theoretical framework  Reis Mourao recall the attention on the vast literature 
produced regard the Fiscal Illusion, and then builds a quantitavive models which adopts a range of 
twenty-six  variables,  taking  into  account  their  use  in  the  literature,  analytical  soundness, 
measurability, country coverage, relevance to the phenomenon being measured, and relationship to 
each other, to develop a robust index. The data is related to 68 countries, including developing and 
developed countries. The countries were selected using the specific filter, who have chosen only 
those democracies with comparable requisite. The period covered in his investigation is from 1960 
to 2006. From the analisys emerge  a decrease in the values of the Fiscal Illusion index for all 
countries between 1960 and 2006 which  reveals that there has been a generalized reduction in 
Fiscal Illusion over time. Therefore, we  can infer that democratic maturity improves good 
governance practices, consequently reducing Fiscal Illusion levels. However, how is evident, this 
reduction was not equal across countries. The most significant improvements occurred in countries 
like Belgium, Italy, Portugal, or Spain, with a significant  decrease of more than fifty percent. 
Although the numbers of variable and the correlation between them generally can conduct to mis-
interpretation  and  consequently  not  correct  conclusions,  some  general  considerations  can  be 
stressed. 
In this study the countries were grouped according to two dimensions: age of democracy (old/new 
democracies) and degree of development of the country (developed/developing). The  old 
democracies include the established democracies 32 countries were considered as “old” 
democracies and the other 36 as “new”10.
However, it is important to point out that in 2006, the geopolitical scenario was completely changed 
respect to the past, the  new democracies or developing countries had a level of Fiscal Illusion 
equivalent to the one characterizing old democracies or developed countries in 1960. This fact 
suggests that new democracies or developing countries, on average, are exhibiting the Fiscal 
Illusion dimensions that the developed world had forty years ago. 
Moreover, from the time series observed, emerge some lines of tendency, the Fiscal Illusion level 
of the new democracies/developing countries remained stable until 1984-1985, years that signal the 
beginning of a period of diminishing values. After a period of a more significant decrease (1984-
1995), the level of Fiscal Illusion stabilized until the last temporal observation. 
This reveals that in spite of the national and international economic, social, and political 
convulsions, there are institutions in each country and in each group of countries that maintain the 
fiscal and political practices leading to a “natural” value of Fiscal Illusion, which can be adopted in 
my view as a indicator of democratization of the public policy.  
A different point of view is expressed by Wallace Oates in his article he considers the limits of the 
empirical  literature  on  the  Fiscal  Illusion11.  His  reservation  on  the  results  produced  by  the 
econometric findings are concentrated on the endogeneity of the illusion variables and alternative 
explanations of the results. A part the classical objections directed toward the econometric studies, it 
is needs remember that statistical correlation don't demonstrate the existence of nexus of casualty.  
9 Cfr.: P. Reis Mourao - Towards a Puviani’s Fiscal Illusion Index - Revista de Economía Pública, 187- (4/2008), p. 
49-86.
10 Cfr.: P. Reis Mourao - Towards a Puviani’s Fiscal Illusion Index - Revista de Economía Pública, 187- (4/2008), p. 
49-86.
11 Cfr.: W. E Oates - On the Nature and Measurement of Fiscal Illusion: A Survey - In G. Brennan et al., eds., Taxation 
and Fiscal Federalism: Essays in Honour of Russell Mathews (Sydney: Australian National University Press, 1988). 
p. 65-82.
The Second observation formulated by Oates considers the subjectivity of the fiscal illusion. The 
authors  is  convinced  that  because  the  phenomenon  is  strictly  related  with  individual  and 
psychological  behavior,  it  is  not  possible  a  “categorization”,  thus  appear  improper  all  the 
considerations which consider the individuals as a aggregate.  This  last point  seems particularly 
weak to me, because even the marketing analysis which considers the potential consumers  are built 
on a accurate “profilation” of the individuals. 
In  conclusion  we  can  affirm that  the  continuous  developments  of  economics  literature  on  the 
transparency of the government, and the electoral behavior, shows that  despite being an old idea, 
Fiscal Illusion is a  phenomenon that persists in democratic countries, conditioning their 
economies, mainly the public policy12.  
In my view, the contribution of James Buchanan remain a milestones in the analysis of the policy 
maker's behavior. His area of study is a bridge between the political science and the public finance, 
this character of interdisciplinary influenced me to the approach of the macroeconomics questions.
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